劳动保障监察机构如何实现自我职能

　　摘 要

　　
　　当前，我国正处在社会转型的重要时期，在传统的经济模式已经不能完全适应社会发展要求的情况下，经济链条上的每一环都开始积极探索新型的发展模式。作为探索的结果，生产技术伴随着科技进步不断革新，管理模式伴随着市场变化不停优化，站在转型“风口”上的每一个组织和个体都在期望着“起飞”的时刻。可是这些看似美好的形容却正在给我国劳动力市场带来巨大的冲击。对劳资双方而言，一方需要面对经济转型中产生的经济成本和管理成本，另一方则需要面对转型探索过程中逐渐收缩的就业机会，所有这些在转型过程中所经历的“间歇性阵痛”使得两方都越来越倾向于在不断的摩擦中探索对方的“交易”底线，从而使自身度过这一“困难”时期。而这种摩擦的增加，就对我国劳动保障监察制度提出了挑战。
 

　　
　　劳动保障监察作为政府社会性管制的典型制度，是劳动关系协调机制中不可缺少的关键一环。作为管制主体，劳动保障监察机构本应在维护劳动法律规定的前提下，进一步探索监察的边界，即如何在保证劳动者“体面劳动”的情况下，劳资双方可以获得更多的发展。但是就现阶段来看，劳动保障监察制度不仅不能完成其管制目标，最基本的职权行使也出现了问题，所以劳动保障监察制度亟待重新审视。因此笔者在实证调查的基础上，选择了从政府社会性管制的角度入手，探究劳动保障监察制度的立法问题。选择该研究方向的目的在于通过对社会性管制权力运行的普遍模式的探究，肃清我国劳动保障监察的源头问题，从立法的角度规范劳动保障监察职权的运行方式。研究的方法在于通过借鉴社会性管制制度的设计方式，映射我国劳动力市场，从而在立法上探究我国劳动保障监察机构在复杂社会环境下完成监察目标的方法。主要从以下三个方面展开：
　　
　　首先是确认劳动保障监察的权力来源。现阶段我国劳动保障监察存在着诸多问题，其中之一便是权力来源的正当性。因此本文从管制历史和管制理论两个维度出发，探究社会性管制权力来源的正当性。并以此作为参照，理肃我国劳动保障监察权力的正当性问题。
　　
　　其次是劳动保障监察机构的独立性问题。“俘获”和“激励”一直是设计管制制度时所面对的首要问题。既然管制机构和管制者在效用函数中追求组织和自身利益近似必然，那么如何设计制度使得管制机构依然可以达到管制目的就是需要考虑的问题。因此本文通过对不同监察模式的理论和实践进行探究，从政府部门的行为逻辑入手，探究管制主体独立性与否所产生的结果，从而确认监察主体独立性对于劳动保障监察的作用。
　　
　　最后是确认劳动保障监察机构的权限特征。管制的特殊性和专业性使得传统的立法和行政机关在处理管制市场所出现的问题时显得“心有余而力不足”,因此管制权的“混权”特征就随着管制制度的不断成熟而日渐加深。社会性管制作为劳动保障监察的上位概念，前者权限的具体设计对后者而言具有十分重要的借鉴意义。因此笔者在研究社会性管制权限特征的基础上，结合我国劳动保障监察实践中所遇到的问题，进一步细化了具体的职能，以期劳动保障监察制度可以更好的发挥其应有的作用。
　　
　　关键词：政府社会性管制；劳动保障监察；立法建议。
　　

　　ABSTRACT.

　　
　　At present, China is in an important period of social transformation, in the traditionaleconomic model has not fully meet the requirements of social development. Every linkin  the  economic  chain  has  begun  to  actively  explore  new  models  of  development.
　　
　　Therefore, the production technology is constantly innovating along with the progress ofscience and technology innovation, and the management mode is constantly optimizedwith the market changing. Every organization and individual standing on the “ outlet” ofthe transformation is expecting the next “take-off” moment. But these seemingly beautifuldescriptions are bringing a huge impact on the labor market in china. The employer mustface up to the economic transformation of the economic cost and management cost, andthe  employee  is  facing  the  gradually  shrinking  employment  opportunities.  These“intermittent pains” in the process of transformation make the two parties more and moreinclined to explore each other's bottom line in the continuous friction to make themselvesthrough this difficult period. The increase of this kind of friction poses a challenge to thelabor inspection system in China.
　　
　　As an important representative system of the government social regulation, the laborinspection system has been playing a very important role in the labor market. As theregulatory authorities, the labor supervision organization should explore the boundary ofsupervision in the premise of maintaining the labor law, that is, both labor and capital canget more development under the premise of guaranteeing the workers' “decent work”. Butat this stage, the labor inspection system can not only complete its control objectives, themost basic exercise of power also has problems, so the labor inspection system needs tobe reexamined. Therefore, on the basis of fieldwork, the author chooses the angle of thegovernment social regulation to explore the legislation of the labor inspection system.
　　
　　The purpose of choosing this research area is to eliminate the problems of labor inspectionthrough the exploration of the universal mode of social regulation power, and standardizethe operation mode of labor inspection authority from the perspective of legislation. Themethod of study is to draw lessons from the design method of social control system,mapping  the  labor  market  of  our  country,  to  explore  the  methods  of  China's  laborinspection. So, the labor inspection agent can complete monitoring targets in the complexsocial environment. Mainly from the following three aspects:
　　
　　The first is to confirm the sources of power of labor inspection. At present, there aremany problems in China's labor inspection, one of which is the legitimacy of the powersource. Therefore, from the two dimensions of regulatory history and regulatory theory,this paper explores the legitimacy of the sources of social regulatory power. And take thisas a reference, to clarify the legitimacy of China's labor inspection power. Secondly, theindependence  of  labor  inspection  institutions.  “Capture” and  “incentive”  have alwaysbeen the primary problems in the design regulation system. Since regulatory agencies andregulators are pursuing the organization and their own interests in the utility function, itis necessary to consider how the system is designed to enable the government to achieveregulatory objectives. Therefore, this paper explores the theory and practice of differentsupervision mode, starting from the behavioral logic of government departments, thusconfirming the role of subject independence in labor inspection. Finally, it confirms theauthority characteristics of labor inspection institutions. Social regulation as the upperconcept of labor inspection, the specific design of the authority of the former has a veryimportant reference significance for the latter. Therefore, the labor inspection system canbetter play its due role based on the study of social authority characteristics.
　　
　　Keywords: Government social regulation; Labor inspection; Legislative proposals。

　　目录

　　第一章绪论

　　第一节论文选题的理由或意义
　　第二节国内外研究现状及趋势
　　第三节研究方法和可能的创新之处

　　第二章政府社会性管制和劳动保障监察之间的关系

　　第一节相关概念的界定
　　第二节政府社会性管制和劳动保障监察制度的演化史
　　第三节政府社会性管制研究视角的意义

　　第三章我国劳动保障监察制度实施现状调查

　　第一节受访对象的身份构成及相应比例
　　第二节劳动保障监察制度的普及程度
　　第三节劳动保障监察机构履职情况
　　第四节劳动保障监察行为的实施效果

　　第四章政府社会性管制视角下劳动保障监察制度的法律问题

　　第一节劳动保障监察权力的必要性
　　第二节劳动保障监察权力的正当性来源
　　第三节劳动保障监察主体的独立性问题
　　第四节劳动保障监察主体的权限问题

　　第五章我国劳动保障监察制度立法建议

　　第一节提高劳动保障监察立法位阶
　　第二节我国劳动保障监察立法路径选择
　　第三节我国《劳动保障监察法》的立法建议
　　结语
　　参考文献
　　附录1
　　附录2
　　致谢