内容摘要
守法是法的实施的基本形式之一，一旦守法出现问题，整个法的运行过程必然出现障碍，法治社会的建设也就成为一句空话。因此，守法是法治社会不言自明的、最基本的要求，并且作为法治的一个必不可少的组成部分受到人们的关注。虽然有关法治的研究基本上都会涉及到守法，但是将守法作为专门研究对象的相关文章，不仅数量不多，而且主要承袭亚里斯多德以来对法治的定义，从伦理和道德的角度来证成守法主体完全守法的必要性。
然而，法治社会中大量不法行为的长期存在，却是要求完全守法的经典理论难以解释的。因为根据守法主体必须完全守法的法治理论，国家没有理由不尽力消除这些不法行为，守法主体没有理由不完全守法。这种现实和经典理论之间的差异必然有其背后的原因，即国家现阶段施行的以经济发展为优先目标的政策。由于以经济发展为优先目标，受经济社会资源有限的制约，国家不会投入远超其守法收益的资源去保证法律百分之百被守法主体遵守，所以守法主体在特定的条件下，完全可能只冒很小的风险而获得远大于其违法成本的收益。因此，在保证国家实现经济发展目标的前提下，如何采取相应措施，以期达到最好的守法效果，是人们不得不认真考虑的问题。
本文选择从经济学的角度对守法主体的守法行为进行分析，并运用冯·诺伊曼和摩根斯顿创立的期望效用函数理论，参照波斯纳在《法律的经济分析》中使用的线性分析方法，建立相应的经济模型。指出在以经济发展为优先目标的现代社会，如果不违反经济规律，作为整体的守法主体不可能达成完全守法。如果不能确立完全守法要求的优先地位，这种不法行为一定程度存在的事实似乎无解。
本文选取某个存在大量不法行为的特殊守法主体，即甲企业对劳资关系的处理作为例证，通过几个典型案例，包括张某工伤赔偿案、苏某变相解雇案以及生产线员工最低工资纠纷案，对企业在这些案例中作出不法行为选择的原因进行经济学分析，指出影响企业作出不法行为选择的根本原因是其自身的成本收益考量，法律只是影响其成本收益的一个变量而已。即使专门聘请法律顾问，企业的出发点也不是如何更好地遵守法律，而是自身利益最大化，包括为其有利于自身的各种不法行为选择提供法律技术上的支持。而对企业守法行为选择影响最大的几个因素，主要包括立法瑕疵、执法投入有限、新法律的适应过程以及法律主体之间力量的不均衡。
接着，本文主要围绕上述因素，论证在以经济发展为优先目标的现代社会，相应的不法行为存在的难以避免。
第一，立法瑕疵。通过对立法瑕疵必然存在的函数线性模式分析，指出在资源有效配置的经济原则的支配下，法律必然存在一定程度的立法瑕疵。接着以劳动法部门中的《工伤保险条例》和《劳动争议调解仲裁法》存在的相关立法瑕疵为例证，说明立法瑕疵必然导致一定的不法行为的产生，由于以经济发展为优先目标，这些不法行为的存在难以避免。
第二，执法资源有限。根据执法投入对守法行为影响的函数线性模型，推导出在以经济发展为优先目标的现代社会，由于资源有限，执法投入只能选择达到社会福利最大化的守法程度，而不是可能的最高值100%，因此不得不容许一定程度的不法行为的存在。并指出在特殊的情况下，比如由“GDP至上主义”主导的行政执法部门，由于对不影响GDP增长的不法行为的社会危害低估，会进一步提高其对此类不法行为的容忍度，导致更多的不法行为选择的产生。
第三，新法律的适应过程。新法律的实施，由于其直接打破了原有的利益分配格局，而且具体效果尚需时间来证明，必然会遭到某些守法主体的怀疑和误解。而这些怀疑和误解，导致了新法适应过程中守法主体的各种不法行为。本文首先通过对新法适应过程的线性分析说明新法适应过程存在的必然，接着以新《劳动合同法》为例证，对其出台引起企业作出各种不法行为选择的原因进行详细的经济学分析，证明这些不法行为的出现是由于新法适应过程造成。同新法实施过程的在经济学上难以避免相对应，由此引起的不法行为的存在同样难以避免。
第四，国家影响力不足下的博弈。在以经济发展为优先目标导致国家影响力不足的情况下，守法主体的行为模式选择取决于其与同类主体及受法律保护的弱势群体的博弈结果。根据搭便车理论，搭便车带来的成本优势使企业不可能放弃搭便车的努力。根据独木桥模式，在产生纠纷的主体双方力量差异较大的情况下，受侵害的弱势方往往选择屈服。这些原因都促使某些守法主体在国家影响力不足时，为了自身的利益最大化，而作出规避法律甚至是公然违法的不法行为选择。在国家难以投入更多资源改变这种现实的情况下，搭便车和独木桥博弈模式造成的不法行为选择就有了存在的空间。
第五，行为经济学上的各种心理效应，进一步强化了强势群体的不法行为选择。本文选择能够适用于分析企业守法行为的若干行为经济学理论，主要包括极端规避（ExtremenessAversion）、确定效应（CertaintyEffect）和反射效应（ReflectionEffect）、基于案例决策（Case-basedDecesions）理论以及损失规避（LossAversion）理论下的禀赋效应（EndowmentEffect）理论。通过上述理论的分析，可以看出当法律主体力量不均衡时，在纠纷解决的过程中，这种不均衡通过行为经济学的一系列效应被进一步放大。
从而能够更好地解释在以经济发展为优先目标的前提下，当国家影响力不足时，守法主体为了自身利益最大化而作出不法行为选择的原因。
根据以上分析，本文提出了建立和谐劳资关系的守法对策。目前存在的劳资关系不和谐的主要原因之一，是国家法治建设的不完善。这种不完善主要表现在立法瑕疵过多、执法力度不足、法律主体力量不均衡三个方面。因此有必要继续完善立法，加大执法力度，将弱势群体适当组织起来，最终实现劳动法的立法目的顺利达成、劳资关系和谐、企业可持续发展、社会福利最大化的理想目标。
然后，本文根据上述企业处理劳资关系时守法行为选择的经济学分析，得出在以经济发展为优先目标的现代社会，国家达成良好的守法效果的主要条件。即，法律规定基本符合资源有效配置原则、严格执法、减少适应法律的成本、当事人之间有效的成本制约、市场干预的适度、支付得起的法律救济程序。
最后，本文指出，通过上述分析，可以得出在以经济发展为优先目标的现代社会，不同于经典完全守法理论的几个结论。包括：第一，也是根本的结论，由于经济发展的目标同完全守法的目标两者不可能同时达成，因此在以经济发展为优先目标的现代社会，一定程度的不法行为的存在是无法避免的事实，似乎也成为法治建设进程中无解的难题。第二，在以经济发展为优先目标的情况下，所谓良法，只能是基本符合资源有效配置原则的法律，而不是理想的完全符合正义原则的毫无瑕疵的法律。第三，“执法必严”的原则，是法治社会必不可少的条件，但在以经济发展为优先目标的情况下，“执法必严”依然会受到经济因素的限制，从而难以保证完全守法的实现。第四，对于一般守法主体，由于经济利益的驱使，在条件具备的时候，往往也会作出某些不法行为选择，而不是成为理想中完全守法的“良好”公民。
关键词：守法；守法行为；成本；收益；经济学分析
Abstract
As a basic link of the working system of the law, once law-abiding have some problem,the whole system can’t work well, and the foundation of a society under the rule of law alsocan’t be achieved. So, law-abiding is the basic requirement of a society under the rule of law.
But, we can only find few papers about law-abiding, and on these papers, authors generallywant to show the necessity of the absolutely abiding by law through the ethic and moral way.
But, there are always lots of illegal behavior in a society under the rule of law, thatcannot be explained by the traditional theory of the absolutely law-abiding. Following thistheory, the goverment must try its best to eradicate such illegal behavior, and a society underthe rule of law also should be a society absolutly law-abiding. So, the existence of these factsmust have other reasons which are not included by the traditional theory, namely theeconomic reasons. With limited resource, it’s impossible that the goverment put too muchlegislation and law enforcrment resource to pursuit too little income from the law-abiding inorder to ensure the subjects’ absolutly law-abiding, and it’s also impossible that the subjectsdon’t want to get higher illegal income with little risk, but abide by law.
So, in this thesis the economic way has been selected to analysis the law-abidingbehavior of the subjects. Then, with the related economic model, the author indicate that,according to the economic laws, it’s impossible that the subjects are absolutely abiding by law,but do lots of illegal actions. What the govermwnt should pursue, is not the subjects’ absolutlyabiding by law, but the moderately abiding by law in accord with the principle of efficientlydeploying the resource.
In the first chapter, the treatment about employee-employer relations of a special subjectwith lots of illegal behavior，enterprise A，has been selected as an illustration. With severaltypical case, such as the case about the compensation of Zhang’s work injury, the case of Su’sbeing covertly dismissed, and the case of the dispute about the minimum wage of theproduction line workers, the reason of the illegal behavior of the enterprise in these cases hasbeen analysed through economic way, and point out that the ultimate reason of the illegalbehavior is the enterprise’s consideration about the cost and income, law is only one of thefactors of this consideration. Even the case about the employment of a counselor, the ultimateobjective of the enterprise is not come from the law-abiding consideration, but themaximization of the enterprise’s profit. In some measure, the enterprise want to find aprofessional man to safeguard their profit from the illegal behavior. And the most importantfactors which have affected the selection of the law-abiding behavior, include the legislationdefects, the limited law enforcrment input, the adaptive process of the new law, and the greatdisparity in strength between the legal subjects.
In succession, around these factors, the inevitability of the illegal behavior’s existencehas been demonstrate.
First，the legislation defects. In the second chapter, through the linearity analysis of thenecessity existence of the legislation, demonstrate that, as under the principle of efficientallocation of resources, our society have to accept some legislation defects to a certain extent.
Then, the legislation defects of the “Labor Contract Law” and the “Law on Mediation andArbitration of Labor Disputes” have been selected as examples to illustrate that the legislationdefects inevitably result in certain illegal behavior, so the existence of such illegal behaviordoesn’t violet the maximum social welfare principal.
Second, the limited law enforcrment resources. In the third chapter, through the linearityanalysis of the effect as the law enforcement resources put into the law-abiding behavior,demonstrate that, with the limited resource, under the principle of efficient allocation ofresources, the law enforcement input should reach the moderation level of the law-abiding,with this level, the maximum social welfare can be achieved, but not the possible highestlevel, one hundred percent. In this instance, we can only choose the moderate lawenforcement input, which can achieve the moderate law-abiding level, and have to allow ofthe existence of large quantity of illegal acts. Then demonstrate that, in some special instance,such as the administrative law enforcement departments which have been predominanted bythe GDP supremacist, maybe allow the existence of larger quantity of such illegal acts,because they undervalue the social harm brought by the illegal acts which do not affect theincrease of the GDP.
Third, the adaptive process of the new law. Because the new law’s enforcement directlybreaks the old pattern of the distribution of benefits, and the special effect of the new lawshould be testified by time, inevitably some subject will be suspicious and misconceive it.
And in such instance, must result in many kinds of illegal acts during the adaptive process ofthe new law. In Chapter 4, at the beginning, the neccesity of the existence of the adaptiveprocess of the new law has been illustrated through the linearity analysis, then the new “LaborContract Law” has been selected as an illustration, the cause why its enforcement can bringthe enterprise into the illegal acts has been detailed analyzed, in order to prove that suchillegal acts are produced by the adaptive process of the new law. The same as the moderateexistence of the adaptive process of the new law is accord with the principle of efficientallocation of resources, the moderate existence of such illegal behavior is conforming with theprinciple of efficient allocation of resources, too.
Forth，the game with deficiency of state influence. In Chapter 5, this thesis points outthat, as the deficiency of state influence because of the limited resources, the patterns of thesubject’s acts are determined by the result of the game among the subject , other subjects ofthe same kind and vulnerable groups under legal protection. According to the free-rider theory,because of the cost advantage of the free-rider, it’s impossible that the enterprise don’t try itsbest to be the free-rider. According to the single-plank bridge theory model, as the greatdisparity in strength between the legal subjects, the weak being infringed often give up.
Because of these factors, as the state influence is deficiency, in order to maximize their ownbenefits, the subjects will make illegal chioces, such as circumventing the law, even flagrantlyillegal behavior. In order to change the models of these games, state must input moreresources. Because of the limited state resources, the illegal acts that come from the games offree-rider and single-plank bridge has its space to exist.
Fifth, the psychological effects of behavioral economic further strengthen the illegal actschoices. In Chapter 6, some behavioral economic theories which are suit to analyze theenterprise’s illegal acts has been selected, such as the Extremeness Aversion Theory, theCertainty Effect Theory, the Reflection Effect Theory, the Case-based Decesions Theory andthe Endowment Effect under the Loss Aversion Theory. Through the above analysis, we cansee that, because of the great disparity in strength between the legal subjects, the greatdisparity will be further strengthed by a series of effects of behavioral economic during thedispute resolution process. Then, we can better explain, when state influence is deficiency,why the subjects make illegal choices to maximize their own benefits.
According the above analysis, in Chapter 7, this thesis proposes somecountermeasures to build a harmonious labor relations. At present, the most important reasonfor the unharmonious labor relations comes from the imperfection of the national rule of law.
We can see the imperfection from four aspects, such as excessive legislation defects,inadequate law enforcement input, publicity of the law and the great disparity in strengthbetween the legal subjects. So, we must continuously improve the legislative, increase the lawenforcement input, strengthen the publicity of the law, and unite the vulnerable groups to acertain extent. Then, we can achieve the ideal goals, such as the achieved legislative purpose,the harmonious labor relations, enterprises’ sustainable development, the maximum socialbenefits.
Then, in Chapter 8, according to the above economic analysis about the law-abidingbehavior when the enterprises deal with the labor relation, this thesis demonstrates the sixconditions necessity for the legal subjects’ good law-abiding behavior, namely, the law isaccord to the principle of efficiently deploying the resource, moderate law enforcement input,reduce the adaptive cost of the new law, the effective cost restriction between legal subjects,moderate market intervention, affordable relief proceedings.
Finally，in the Conclusion, this thsis point out that, according to the above analysis,because of the limited resources of our society and the principal of the maximum socialbenefits, we can draw several different conclusions from the traditional absolute law-abidingtheory: First, also the most imprtant conclusion, the purpose of our society with limitedresources should be the moderate law-abiding, but not the absolut law-abiding required by thetraditional theory. Second, the standard of the good law, shoule be the law according to theprinciple of efficiently deploying the resource, but not the ideal perfect law according to theabsolut justice. Third, for the maximum social benefits, the principal of “strictly enforce law ”,should be the law being moderately strictly enforcement, but not as strict as possible. Fourth,to the legal subjects, the most appropriate economic choice for their benefits, should also bethe moderate law-abiding, not the idea citizen absolutely abided by the law.
Key words: law-abiding; law-abiding behavior; cost; income; economic analysis
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